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1 Introduction
Vertical integration is the object of two main streams of literature: Industrial
Organization (Grossman Hart, 1986; Perry, 1989) and Economics of Institu-
tions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971, 1985, 1986). In this second strand,
transaction cost economics has played a prominent role and has become a
paradigm that other disciplines eventually borrowed. In most investigations
of the internal organisation of the firm, vertical integration appears as a
reaction either to excessive costs of transacting inputs or to some of the
externalities that make markets socially inferior to the governance system
provided by a corporate organization embodied in a firm.
A large set of externalities is also directly or indirectly associated to ver-
tical integration and its opposite, vertical segmentation. Among them, the
one represented by double marginalization seems to be one of the most cru-
cial. Whenever a downstream (D) firm increases its market price, this move
aﬀects negatively the profit of the upstream (U) firm (or firms). This firm
sells its output which is used as an input for D production. The integrated
firm embodying both production stages (U and D) is able to internalize this
externality and, therefore, produces a larger output which is sold at a lower
price (Spengler, 1951; Tirole, 1989).
Other externalities occur in vertical relationships. Some of them make
unsustainable the coexistence of firms with idiosyncratic levels of vertical in-
tegration in the same sector. This class of externalities is due to the captive
relationship in which the U firm is trapped when selling to a single D firm.
When the number of firms operating in the D section of the market increases,
for instance because of trade integration, U firms have broader choice and
their captive condition can be relaxed. As the number of firms ”breaking
their chains” increases, it becomes easier for U firms to find D buyers who
will compete among them to get their inputs. Then U firms will be less liable
to be cornered. The externality emerges as the number of D firms increases
since the captive position becomes less and less burdensome and the alterna-
tive arrangement, i.e. vertical integration looses its attractiveness as a way
to escape from the hold up problem (McLaren, 1999, 2000; Grossman and
Helpman, 2002; Spencer and Jones, 1991). Despite of the attractiveness of
the theoretical interpretation of this externality, we find also models where
integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist because of contractual specificities
of firms producing close substitutes or simply because of product diﬀeren-
tiation (Jansen, 2003; Lambertini and Rossini, 2003; Pepall and Norman,
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2001).
Empirical analyses concerning the strategic eﬀects of vertical integration
and vertical disintegration are quite few and do not address the question of
the coexistence of diﬀerent vertical arrangements in the same industry, yet
they rather go through the welfare eﬀects of integration and disintegration
(Slade, 1998 a,b).
As a matter of fact, the decision to either vertically integrate or resort
to outsourcing is highly dependent upon the ability and the incentives of
firms to undertake productive activities in an eﬃcient way in one of the two
alternative organizational arrangements. However, the production activities
of a firm very often include R&D commitments that may innovate either the
production process or the product (Teece, 1976; Armour and Teece, 1980).
These activities may change the incentive to integrate or to adopt outsourcing
when they give rise to vertical spillover, or take place among firms with het-
erogeneous objectives (Rossini, 2003). The existence of externalities in R&D
is widely analyzed in the literature (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) but
it has never been related to vertical relationships. Our aim is to analyse
vertical process innovating R&D activities with spillovers and we shall con-
centrate on their eﬀects on the incentives to integrate. In some circumstances,
technological spillovers may neutralize or even be larger than the traditional
externality that exists along the vertical chain. To this purpose, we shall
walk along many scenarios in which the vertical R&D spillover takes place.
In particular, we shall investigate the eﬀects of spillovers flowing two ways
from U to D and from D to U. The case of asymmetric externalities will also
be considered so as to contribute to a more general picture. As we shall see,
the introduction of process R&D with vertical spillover changes the received
result of the superior social performance of vertical integration when there
are imperfectly competitive firms.
The paper is organized around the model of process vertical R&D with
spillovers that is introduced in the next section. In section 3, we provide some
comparisons when symmetric spillovers occur. In section 4, we go through
the case of asymmetric spillovers. In section 5, we consider asymmetric costs
of R&D. Conclusions are in section 6.
3
2 The model with symmetric R&D spillovers
In this section we model the two alternative vertical arrangements, one with
integration and the other with decentralization or disintegration. We go
through the case of a monopoly since it is the only one analytically tractable.
However, the externality that exists in the vertical chain when integration
is assumed away remains in all cases of non perfect competition. Therefore,
most of these results may be extended to oligopolistic markets.
2.1 Vertical decentralization
We consider a homogeneous monopoly facing a linear demand curve for a
final, or downstream (D) good sold to consumers
pD = a− qD (1)
Production is organized along a vertical process whereby the final output
is assembled by a D monopolist who needs an intermediate good for its
production. The intermediate good is produced by an upstream (U) firm
that requires no produced input. The cost structure of the D firm is given
by the following function
cD = c− xD − βxU (2)
where cD, the marginal cost of production of the D firm, is composed by a
simple marginal cost c minus an amount xD that reduces the marginal cost
thanks to process R&D undertaken by the D firm. This activity is modeled,
according to received literature, using a convex technology (d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988) represented by an R&D total cost function with increasing
marginal cost
kD = γ
x2D
2
, (3)
where γ is a technological parameter related to the marginal cost of R&D.
The spillover parameter β ∈ [0, 1] in (2) multiplies the amount of cost re-
duction xU undertaken by the firm in the U stage and it is the vehicle for
the external beneficial eﬀect of the R&D undertaken by the U firm upon
the marginal cost of the D firm. kD represents the total cost of R&D. The
objective of the D firm is to maximise
πD(qD, xD) = qD(pD − cD − g)− γ
x2D
2
(4)
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where g is the price paid by the D firm for one unit of the intermediate good
needed to produce one unit of the final good (perfect vertical complemen-
tarity assumption). The D monopolist maximises profit with respect to the
quantity sold and the amount of cost reduction to be obtained via process
innovating R&D.
Now we go to the U firm that chooses its optimal price and cost reduction
by maximising:
πU(g, xU) = qU(g − cU)− γ
x2U
2
(5)
where the cost reduction follows a similar rule as in (3) making for the fol-
lowing marginal cost:1
cU = c− xU − βxD. (6)
As it appears, we assume that the vertical spillover is symmetric and goes
both ways. Taking FOCs for the U and D firms and doing substitutions we
get:2
x∗U =
A(1 + β)
4γ − 3− β(4 + β) (7)
g∗ =
(a− c)(2 + 3β − 2γ) + c(1 + β(1 + β)− 2γ)
4γ − 3− β(4 + β) (8)
π∗U =
A2γ
2(4γ − 3− β(4 + β)) (9)
π∗D =
A2γ(2γ − 1)
2(4γ − 3− β(4 + β))2 (10)
p∗D =
(3a+ 2c)γ − a(1 + β)(3 + β)
4γ − 3− β(4 + β) (11)
x∗D =
A
4γ − 3− β(4 + β) . (12)
1We make the simplifying assumption that the marginal costs are symmetric along
the vertical chain (i.e., both firms bear the same marginal cost). The entire analysis of
the paper has also been conducted with asymmetric marginal costs, reaching qualitatively
analogous conclusions.
2We adopt the short hand A ≡ a− 2c.
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Second order conditions (SOCs) and nonnegativity constraints on market
variables and marginal costs after R&D are assured by the condition:3
γ ≥ a(1 + 2β) + c(1 + β
2)
4c
= γd. (13)
2.2 Vertical integration
In the vertically integrated monopoly the input is produced by the U divi-
sion and internally transferred at its opportunity cost, equal to the marginal
cost. Demand, production and R&D technologies are the same as above and,
therefore, the objective of the integrated (I) monopoly is:
πI(qDI , xDI , xUI) = qDI(pDI − cDI − cUI)− γ
(x2DI + x
2
UI)
2
. (14)
By taking systemic FOCs we can get reduced form controls:
x∗DI =
A(1 + β)
2[γ − (1 + β)2] = x
∗
UI (15)
q∗DI =
Aγ
2[γ − (1 + β)2] (16)
3The SOCs that must be simultaneously met are:
γ ≥ 1
2b
= γa
γ ≥ 3 + β(4 + β)
4b
= γc
γ ≥ 1 + β
2b
= γb.
However, the binding condition involves γc, since γc ≥ γb ≥ γa. Moreover, we have to
assure that R&D does not make for negative marginal costs, i.e.:
c− xU − βxD ≥ 0
c− xD − βxU ≥ 0.
These two conditions require that
γ ≥ a(1 + 2β) + c(1 + β
2)
4c
= γd.
Hence the final binding condition is γ ≥ γd, since γd ≥ γc.
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π∗I =
A2γ
4[γ − (1 + β)2] (17)
p∗DI =
(a+ 2c)γ − 2a(1 + β)2
2[γ − (1 + β)2] . (18)
SOCs and nonnegativity constraints boil down to:4
γ ≥ a(1 + β)
2
2c
= γi. (19)
Straightforward comparison reveals that γi ≥ γd. Then, the admissible
parameter region for the integrated firm to invest in R&D is a subset of
that associated with the disintegrated firm, investing also for lower levels of
γ ∈ [γd, γi], where the integrated firm does not.
3 Integration vs non integration with sym-
metric spillovers
We are now ready to undertake some intriguing comparisons between the
two market arrangements.
First, we confine the analysis to a parameter space where both market
settings invest in R&D in the two production stages (U and D). Then we shall
consider also the parameter space in which only the decentralized market
arrangement invests in R&D while the integrated firm does not.
4SOCs require
γ ≥ (1 + β)
2
2
= γe.
Nonnegativity requires
γ ≥ (1 + β)2 = γf ≥ γe.
Moreover, nonnegativity of marginal costs require:
γ ≥ a(1 + β)
2
2c
= γi ≥ γf .
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3.1 Both arrangements invest in R&D
Compare the profits generated by vertical integration (π∗I) against those of
the disintegrated arrangement (π∗U + π
∗
D). Their diﬀerence is:
π∗I − π∗U − π∗D =
γA2
4
·
4β2(1 + β)− 1 + β4 + 4γ − 6β2γ − 4γ2
(3 + 4β + β2 − 4γ)2[(1 + β)2 − γ]
¸
(20)
From the analysis of (20), we may draw the following:
Proposition 1 In the parameter region where both arrangements invest:
• profits are always higher for the integrated firm, and p∗DI ≤ p∗D;
• the overall R&D investment carried out by the integrated firm is larger,
i.e., x∗DI + x
∗
UI ≥ x∗D + x∗U ;
• the traditional result of the social superior performance of the integrated
firm replicates since social welfare with integration (SWI) is larger than
with a non integrated arrangement (SW ).
Proof. To begin with, examine profits. Consider first the denominator of the
expression in square brackets, on the r.h.s. of (20). This is always negative
in the feasible set of γ. Then analyse the numerator. This is positive for
γ ∈ [γr1, γr2], where γr1 =
2−3β2−β
√
4+16β+13β2
4
and γr2 =
2−3β2+β
√
4+16β+13β2
4
are the two roots of the numerator. However, since γr2 ≤ γi, it is established
that, in the common feasible set of parameters, the profits from integration
are always higher than the sum those accruing to the non integrated firms.
As for prices, just calculate the diﬀerence
p∗D − p∗DI =
Aγ(2γ − 1 + β2)
2(3 + 4β + β2 − 4γ)(1 + 2β + β2 − γ)
(21)
which is non negative for γ ≥ γi.
Eventually we compare the R&D investments undertaken in the two ver-
tical arrangements. Just compare the levels of R&D in the U stage:
x∗DI(= x
∗
UI)− x∗D =
A(1 + β)
2γ − 2(1 + β)2 −
A2γ(2γ − 1)
2(4γ − 3− β(4 + β))2
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which is nonnegative. The same happens for the D stage:
x∗DI(= x
∗
UI)− x∗U =
A(1 + β)
2γ − 2(1 + β)2 −
A2γ
2(4γ − 3− β(4 + β)) .
Welfare comparisons are straightforward and are already implicit in higher
profits and lower prices of the integrated arrangement. It is just worth not-
ing that the potentially counterproductive eﬀect associated with the larger
R&D eﬀort carried out by the integrated structure is more than oﬀset by
the resulting reduction observed both in production costs and in the market
price.
3.2 Only the nonintegrated firms invest in R&D
There is a region of the parameter space for γ ∈ [γd, γi] where only the
disintegrated firms invest in R&D. In this region the integrated firm does not
invest in process R&D and therefore maximization of its monopoly profits
lead to the following equilibrium quantity, profit and price
q∗m =
A
2
; π∗m =
A2
4
; p∗m =
(a+ 2c)
2
(22)
where the subscript m stands for the vertically integrated monopoly that
does not invest.
We are then able to write the following the following:
Proposition 2 For all γ ∈ [γd, γi] where the non integrated monopoly under-
takes process R&D along both stages of the vertical production process, while
the integrated monopoly does not. In a subset of this area, γ ∈ [γd, γ2n] ⊂
[γd, γi], non integration is more eﬃcient from a private (profit level) point
of view than its integrated counterpart not investing in R&D in that same
parameter space. The private superiority extends to social welfare since the
price of the integrated firms is lower, when the market size is not too large.
Otherwise, the social superiority occurs in a subset of the above interval.
Proof. The comparison of profits requires evaluating:
π∗m − π∗U − π∗D =
A2
4
½
1− 2γ[6γ − (2 + β)
2]
[3 + β(4 + β)− 4γ]2
¾
(23)
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which is negative for5 γ ∈ [γ1n, γ2n].
However, we have that γ1n ≤ γd ≤ γ2n ≤ γi whenever
2 ≤ 8 + 3β(4 + β) +M
2(1 + β)2
≤ a
c
≤ 7 + 2β(6 + β) +M
1 + 2β
,
with the lower limit ranging between 4.94 and 6.65 and the upper limit
between 11.9 and 12.3 and M =
p
(2 + β(4 + β))(14 + 5β(4 + β)). Then,
if γ ∈ [γd, γ2n] ⊂ [γd, γi], the integrated firm makes less profits than the
disintegrated one only in a subset of the feasible set where the market size is
relatively large. While for ac ≤
8+3β(4+β)+M
2(1+β)2 , we have that [γd, γi] ⊂ [γd, γ2n]
and the private superior performance of the disintegrated firm goes through
the entire feasible set. Notice that this happens for a smaller market size.
We then compare the price of the integrated firm that does not invest in
R&D and the price of the disintegrated firm investing in R&D. The diﬀerence
is
p∗m − p∗D =
A(2γ − 3− β(4 + β))
2(3 + β(4 + β)− 4γ) (24)
which is positive for γ ∈ [γaa, γbb], where γaa =
3+β(4+β)
4
and γbb =
3+β(4+β)
2
. If
we compare the limits of the interval in which profits are higher for the non-
integrated firm with that for γ ∈ [γaa, γbb] we find that [γaa, γbb] ⊂ [γ1n, γ2n]
regardless of the market size. Moreover we find that γd ≥ γaa for all market
sizes and γd ≤ γbb if ac ≤
5+8β+β2
1+2β that ranges between 4.6 and 5.00. This
means that the social superiority of the nonintegrated firm happens to be
associated to smaller market sizes.
This result may be considered as a partial counterpart of the empirical
investigation found in Slade (1998a,b) where the pricing policy of competing
heterogeneous vertical arrangements are compared in markets where verti-
cally integrated and disintegrated firms coexist and compete.
5The two roots of (23) are γ1n and γ2n respectively equal to
8 + 12β + 3β2 −
p
28 + 96β + 104β2 + 40β3 + 5β4
4
and
8 + 12β + 3β2 +
p
28 + 96β + 104β2 + 40β3 + 5β4
4
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4 Asymmetric spillovers
Here are two cases in which the spillover flows vertically from one stage to
the other.
4.1 From D to U
We first investigate the case of the externality in R&D going from D to U.
This happens when the final producer’s process R&D stimulates R&D in U,
for instance, asking for a rationalisation of U production processes to reduce
costs. This is the most common direction of the spillover. The next one,
from U to D, is more rare in actual vertical relationships.
We first analyse the nonintegrated case. The cost function for the D firm
is
cD = c− xD (25)
while the profit function is
πD(qD, xD) = qD(pD − c+ xD − g)− γ
x2D
2
(26)
The cost function of the U firm is (6) and the profit function is (5). By
going through the optimisation program of the two firms we get the optimal
controls:
q∗D =
A
4γ − 3− 2β (27)
x∗U =
A
4γ − 3− 2β = x
∗
D . (28)
This result is due to the fact that the externality is not internalised.
The price charged by the U firm is:
g∗ =
2a(1 + β + γ)− c
3 + 2β − 4γ . (29)
The profits are respectively:
π∗U =
A2γ
(8γ − 6− 4β) ; π
∗
D =
A2γ(2γ − 1)
2(3 + 2β − 4γ)2 . (30)
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The market price of the final good is6
p∗D =
a(3 + 2β)− (3a+ 2c)γ
3 + 2β − 4γ . (31)
Now we analyse the integrated arrangement with the same cost and R&D
structure. The profit function is:
πI(qI , xID, xIU) = qI(pI − cD − cU)− γ
x2ID
2
− γx
2
IU
2
. (32)
From the FOCs we get:
q∗ID =
Aγ
2γ − 2β − β2
(33)
x∗ID =
A(1 + β)
2γ − 2β − β2
(34)
x∗IU =
A
2γ − 2β − β2
(35)
which show that internalisation of the externality makes for a diﬀerent level
of R&D in the two stages of the production process: the commitment at the
D stage is larger than at the U stage.7 The reduced form profits and the
market price are:
π∗I =
A2γ
2(2γ − 2β − β2)
(36)
p∗I =
a(2 + β(2 + β))− (a+ 2c)γ
2 + β(2 + β)− 2γ . (37)
We are then able to write:
Proposition 3 When the R&D spillover flows from D to U, the profits of
the integrated firm are larger than the aggregate profits of the non integrated
arrangement. For all γ ∈ [γA1, γA3], the non integrated arrangement makes
higher profits. However, the integrated part is always able to secure lower
prices.
6SOCs and nonnegativity constraints require γ ≥ 3 + 2β
4
= γA2.
7SOCs and nonnegativity constraints require γ ≥ 1 + (1 + β)
2
2
= γA1 ≥ γA2.
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Proof. We carry out the comparisons among the two arrangements. First
consider profit:
π∗I − π∗U − π∗D = −
A2γ[−2β3 + (1− 2bγ)2 + β2(6γ − 4)]
2(3 + 2β − 4γ)2(2 + 2β + β2 − 2γ)
. (38)
whose sign is nonnegative for γ ≥ 2+β(−3β+
√
4+β(8+9β)
4
= γA3 and for γ ≤
2−β(3β+
√
4+β(8+9β)
4
= γA4. However, by a further comparison we see that
γA3 ≥ γA1 if 1 ≤
q
2−3β2+β
√
4+β(8+9β)√
4+4β+2β2
. Then, in the interval γ ∈ [γA1, γA3] the
nonintegrated firms make a larger profit than their integrated counterpart.
When the prices are considered the comparison is between (37) and (31).
It appears that
p∗D − p∗I =
Aγ(2γ + β2 − 1)
(3 + 2β − 4γ)(2 + β(2 + β)− 2γ)
is nonnegative in the feasible space of parameters.
Here again, as in the previous section we can explore what happens in
the region of the parameters space in which only the nonintegrated arrange-
ment invests in process R&D while the integrated counterpart does not. The
investigation of this case can be summarized in the following
Corollary 4 The feasible set of the VI firm is a subset of the feasible set of
the NI firm. Accordingly, there exists an interval of the parameter space where
the VI does not undertake any R&D while the decentralised arrangement does.
If γ is suﬃciently low, the nonintegrated firm is both privately and socially
more eﬃcient. Conversely, if γ is suﬃciently large, the non integrated firm
is privately more eﬃcient yet it charges a higher price than the integrated
counterpart.
Proof. The optimal values of controls for the nonintegrated arrangement
are (27), (28), (29) and (31), while profits are (30).
The marginal costs borne by the integrated (but non investing) firm are
cU = cD = c.
The controls and the optimal profits of the VI firm that does not invest are:
q∗DInoinv =
A
2b
; π∗Inoinv =
A2
4b
; p∗DInoinv =
a+ 2c
2
. (39)
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Comparison of profits leads to:
π∗Inoinv − π∗U − π∗D =
A2(9 + 4β2 − 16γ + 4γ2 − 12β(γ − 1))
4(3 + 2β − 4γ)2
which is nonnegative if
γ ≥ 4 + 3β +
p
(1 + β)(7 + 5β)
2
= γA5.
However γA5 ≥ γA6 = 3+2β4 that defines the minimum level of feasible γ
for the nonintegrated investing arrangement. Then for γ ∈ [γA6, γA5] the
nonintegrated profits are larger than the profits of the integrated firm, that
does not invest. The comparison of prices leads to
p∗DInoinv − p∗D =
A(2γ − 3− 2β)
6 + 4β − 8γ
It appears that the above diﬀerence is positive for γ ∈ [γA6, γA7] and negative
for γ ∈ [γA7, γA5], where γA7 = 3+2β2 .
4.2 From U to D
Here we go through the opposite case in which the externality flows from the
U stage down to the final D stage. This kind of spillover may be thought to
be more common since progress in the production process of the input tends
to stimulate D firms to improve the cost profile of their assembling structure.
The cost structure is now given by (2) and:
cU = c− xU . (40)
Optimal controls and profits for the nonintegrated case are:8
x∗U =
A(1 + β)
(4γ − 3− β(2 + β)) (41)
x∗D =
A
(4γ − 3− β(2 + β)) (42)
8SOCs and nonnegativity constraints boil down to the condition γ ≥ 3 + β(2 + β)
4
=
γB1.
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q∗D =
Aγ
(4γ − 3− β(2 + β)) (43)
π∗D =
A2γ(2γ − 1)
2(4γ − 3− β(2 + β))2 (44)
π∗U = −
A2γ
2(4γ − 3− β(2 + β)) (45)
p∗D = −
a(3 + β(2 + β))− (3a+ 2c)γ
4γ − 3− β(2 + β) , (46)
while in the integrated we have:
x∗UI =
A(1 + β)
(2γ − 2− β(2 + β)) (47)
x∗DI =
A
(2γ − 2− β(2 + β)) (48)
q∗DI =
Aγ
(2γ − 2− β(2 + β)) (49)
p∗DI =
2c− a(1 + β(2 + β))
2γ − 2− β(2 + β) (50)
π∗I =
A2γ
2(2γ − 2− β(2 + β)) (51)
If we compare the VI and the decentralised case we get:
Proposition 5 When the spillover flows from U to D, the VI arrangement
is always superior to the decentralised case from both the private and the
social standpoint.
Proof. Just compare (51) with the sum of (44) and (45). It appears that
in the common feasibility parameter space (i.e. for γ ≥ 1+(1+β)2
2
= γB2) the
profits of the integrated arrangements are larger. Then compare (50) with
(46). We see that the final D price in the non integrated arrangement is
higher.
Moreover, in the parameters space in which just the nonintegrated firm
invests, we get:
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Corollary 6 If the spillover goes from U to D there exists an interval of the
parameter space where only the nonintegrated arrangement invests in process
R&D. The lower part of this space is associated with a nonintegrated firm
that is making larger profits while setting lower prices than the integrated
counterpart, i.e., a second best optimum obtains. An adjacent interval for
higher levels of γ has the nonintegrated firms making a larger aggregate profit
but setting a higher market price.
Proof. Controls and profit of the VI firm that does not invest are in (39).
If we now calculate
π∗Inoinv − π∗D − π∗U ; (52)
using (44) and (45)) we find that (52) is nonnegative for
γ ≥ 8 + 3β(2 + β) +
p
(2 + β(2 + β))(14 + 5β(2 + β))
4
= γB2.
Since γB2 ≥ γB3 =
3+β(2+β)
4
below which the investing nonintegrated firms
are no longer active, we have that, for γ ∈ [γB3, γB2] the nonintegrated in-
vesting firms make larger aggregate profits than the integrated non investing
firm.
If we compare market prices, we see that
p∗DInoinv − p∗D (53)
which, from (46), is nonnegative for γ ∈ [γB4, γB2], while it is negative for
γ ∈ [γB3, γB4], where γB4 is the value of γ below which (53) is nonnegative.
5 Asymmetric costs of R&D
Here, we adopt a more realistic framework with asymmetric costs of R&D
along the vertical chain of production. Realism is suggested by observation
of industries. For instance, the amount of R&D needed to decrease the cost
of production of a chip is much higher than the amount needed to reduce
the cost of assembling a PC that uses that chip as a component. However,
in other industries it may be the other way around, as for instance in the
automotive industry, where the R&D for a steering wheel is much lower than
that required for the production of a car or a truck. This may also be the case
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in other mature sectors such as the textile/clothing industry. As a matter of
fact, asymmetric R&D costs lend themselves to a more realistic analysis of
vertical R&D.
Here we just assume that there are two distinct γ, a γU and a γD. Then,
we repeat what done in the previous sections. Unfortunately, unlike above,
we are not able to derive analytical results. We can only pin down a remark
that concerns the private incentives for firms:
Remark 1 When γU is large with respect to γD, the integrated arrangement
is privately more eﬃcient. When the opposite obtains, the decentralised ar-
rangement is more profitable. Both arrangements possess ranges of social
second best eﬃciency.
Proof. The diﬀerence between the profits of the two arrangements is
π∗I − π∗D − π∗U
=
A2γDγ
2
U(β
4γD − (1− 2γD)2γU + 2β3(γD + γU) + β2(γD + 3γU − 6γDγU))
2(2(1 + β)γU + γD(1 + 2β + β
2 − 4γU))2((1 + β)2γU + γD((1 + β)2 − 2γU))
The sign of the above equation is nonnegative for γD ∈ [γD1(γU), γD2(γU)].
This statement cannot be proved analytically but only numerically, yet for
the whole range of the feasible set of parameters. Since γU ≥ γD2(γU) we
have that for all γU ≥ γD the integrated firm makes larger profits. When the
opposite obtains, the disintegrated arrangement is privately more eﬃcient.
The analysis of prices carries over the same way and provides subranges of
social second best eﬃciency in both arrangements.
6 Conclusions
The maintained wisdom that, in presence of non perfectly competitive pat-
terns of behaviour, vertical integration is a second best, has been challenged
in the preceding sections by introducing process R&D with spillovers along
the vertical chain of production in a simple homogeneous monopoly environ-
ment. Some results are worth emphasizing since they provide a basis for a
fresh explanation of outsourcing or vertical separation in a framework that
does not take into account any externality coming form firms changing their
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vertical organization (as it occurs in recent contributions by Grossman and
Helpman (2002), McLaren (2000) and Jansen (2003)).
As we consider vertical R&D with spillovers, it appears that the non
integrated firms invest in R&D over a wider set of parameters. When both
the integrated firm and its decentralised counterparts invest in process R&D,
the integrated firm is both privately and socially superior. This result no
longer holds when we consider two distinct marginal costs of R&D in the U
and D stage of production. When R&D activity is more expensive in the D
stage than in the U stage, the decentralised arrangement is privately superior,
in the region of parameters containing the interval of social second best. This
result, that is consistent with some received investigations (Slade, 1998a,b)
may explain the evolution of outsourcing policies as the relative costs of U
and D R&D vary along the vertical chain. Moreover and more importantly,
we find that, when the integrated firm refrains from committing to process
R&D, while the decentralized firms do it, outsourcing may provide larger
aggregate profits, and, in a narrower parameter range, also socially superior
results even if the costs of R&d are symmetric along the vertical chain. These
results obtain in the case of both symmetric and asymmetric R&D spillovers.
We believe these conclusions may be relevant to explain the waves of
vertical integration just on the basis of (i) the changes in the state of the
art of process R&D, and (ii) the amount of spillovers in the downstream and
upstream sections of the vertical chain of production. Further research may
go through the policy implication of these conclusions.
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